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In the Supretne Court of the 
State of Utah 
THOMAS P. SPRlJNT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
The DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8957 
During the daylight hours of January 4, 1957, the 
plaintiff, a 58 year old switchman, employed by the de-
fendant company, was injured when he attempted to board 
an ore car of the defendant company which had just 
started to move and which was travelling two or three 
miles per hour. (R. 41). The accident occurred on the 
switch tracks located on the property of the Vitro Chern-
--~-------------------------
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ical Company. The plaintiff was part of a switch crew 
which was moving cars loaded with Uranium ore into the 
private ·yards of Vitro Chemical Company and moving 
the empties out (R. 13, R. 24). The process involved 
bringing in a string of loaded cars, which were unloaded 
by means of opening dump doors on the sides of the cars, 
allowing the ore to fall out beside the track (R. 17). The 
ore was then picked up by a clam shell machine (a diesel 
machine with a two yard bucket) (R. 18), and deposited 
in stock piles farther away from the track. Then a bull-
dozer would proceed along the area to attempt to remove 
ore that had fallen between the rails and to clean and 
smooth up the area adjacent to the tracks (R. 28). 
Two or three cuts or groups of cars were delivered 
each day (R. 26) so that 12 to 18 cars a day were un-
loaded (R. 25, 56). The switching and unloading was a 
continuous process throughout the day (R. 137). Accord-
ing to the plaintiff the operation of the clam-shell in 
picking up the ore took bites out of the ground in the 
area adjacent to the track, which created the existence of 
numerous holes 8 to 12 inches deep (R. 43). The witness 
Patterson, another member of the crew, claimed that the 
bulldozer did not necessarily remove all the holes in the 
process of its smoothing operation (R. 19). This operation, 
according to plaintiff and his witness, created a rough 
area over which the plaintiff and other switchmen had to 
walk. Patterson testified that the holes were uMaybe three 
feet, maybe five feet" apart (R. 23). 
Plaintiff testified as follows on page 53: 
uQ. Even though the track was cleaned up and it 
was cleaned up as slick as a bowling alley, when 
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another string of cars would come it would clutter 
up the situation? 
ttA. Yes. 
uQ. In other words, if you clean up as I say, clean 
as a bowling alley, you would have to do it two or 
three times a day? 
ttA. Yes. 
uQ. · You would have to interrupt unloading 
operations? 
ccA. Not necessarily. 
ceQ. The work was done 1n that area by Vitro 
people? 
ttA. Yes. 
uQ. With their clam shell? 
ttA. Yes. 
uQ. With their bulldozer? 
ttA. Yes. 
uQ. On their track? 
ttA. Yes. 
ceQ. On their property? 
ttA. Well, as far as I know, it is." 
Mr. John A. Rask, a retired D & RGW section 
foreman, well acquainted with the condition of this yard 
and with the nature of the switching and unloading 
operation at the time of the accident, was called as a 
witness by the plaintiff and on examination by plaintiff's 
counsel, he stated the following: 
uQ. At any time you were on these premises, did 
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you find any smooth path for the switchmen to 
walk on? 
etA. Well, I don't know I have, it has been uneven, 
it hasn't been too bad; where they unload cars and 
dump them it is always rough. 
((Q. Is it necessary to keep it rough? 
((A. It is impossible to keep it otherwise with a 
continuous operation of those cars. 
uQ. You couldn't keep it up with a shovel as you 
do with the men in your area? 
uA. If they had an army of men, but not for each 
continuous operation. 
((Q. What do you mean by continuous operation? 
((A. Dumping one car and another one on top, that 
is a continuous operation all day long." (R. 137) 
At the time of the accident there was a cclight skiff 
of snow" on the ground (R. 31) . The plaintiff attempted 
to board one of the moving cars by taking hold of a grab 
iron on the side of the car with his left hand, putting his 
foot in a stirrup and swinging himself up onto the car. He 
claimed his foot slipped or he stepped into a hole, fell and 
injured his left shoulder (R. 41-42). 
Exactly what happened or what he did at the time of 
the accident is not clear in the plaintiff's mind for he 
describes it differently in different places in the record. 
uQ. (By Mr. Patterson) Now, what happened when 
you-describe how you started to mount the car, 
what you did? 
etA. Well, as a general rule when you are switching 
on a lead, or anything, we most generally hit the 
stirrup with our right foot and most generally 
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reach up with the one hand, get hold of the grab 
iron and follow up with the other, when I went to 
follow up I slipped in the meantime, and I couldn't 
get the grab iron. 
(tQ. Why did you slip? 
uA. I stepped in a hole. 
ceQ. Will you describe that hole to the jury, please? 
((A. Well, as far as I remember, it was a hole along 
side the cars where we walked, made by the clam 
shovel cleaning up the ore. 
ceQ. Describe the hole itself as much as you can? 
uA. I would say the hole was around between eight 
and twelve inches deep." (R. 42-43) 
Later, on cross examination, the plaintiff said: 
(tQ. Mr. Sprunt, as I understand you reached up 
with your left hand to board the car going about 
two or three miles an hour, is that right? 
HA. Yes sir. 
uQ. When you got your hand on that particular 
bar, how high would that be? 
ccA. I would say about even with my face. 
uQ. On these dump cars they are kind of low? 
ccA. Well, yes, your ladder on cars is a standard 
gauge. 
(tQ. The grab iron you were going to reach from 
the ground would be about that high? 
teA. Yes. 
uQ. You reached with your left hand? 
ccA. Yes sir. 
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"Q. When you reached with your left hand, did 
you put any weight on there for the purpose of 
boarding the car? 
uA. Well, no, not exactly. 
"Q. Mr. Sprunt, I am not trying to get you, in 
detailing the matter to relate what each muscle did 
in this particular time. When you reached up, what 
was the usual way to do it, put the weight on one 
hand? 
uA. Most generally put the weight on both hands. 
uQ. You reached with the left hand, and hadn't 
got your weight up? 
uA. No sir. 
uQ. You were walking when this occurred? 
uA. No. 
uQ. You were standing still? 
uA. Yes. 
uQ. So you were standing still when the car came 
past going about two or three miles an hour and you 
reached up with your left hand? 
uA. Yes sir, that is right. 
uQ. Were you standing in a hole? 
uA. No I wasn't. 
HQ. Did you move your feet before you got aboard? 
HA. That is something I can't say. 
HQ. As you reached with your left hand, as you 
started to board, your foot went in a hole? 
"A. No, generally when you are boarding a car you 
swing yourself on, when I went to swing on I 
slipped." (R. 58-59) 
:x 
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The plaintiff's left hand lost its grip on the grab iron 
and he fell to the ground (R. 60). 
On page 43 of the record, the plaintiff says: 
H ••• it was done so quick I don't know how I fell." 
Plaintiff's injuries consisted of a tear of the cuff of 
the shoulder, the tendons that go around the head bone of 
the shoulder (R. 69) . The plaintiff had suffered two dis-
locations of the same shoulder, once in 1941 and again 
from an automobile accident in 1954 (R. 60). Plaintiff's 
doctor, Charles Hall, acknowledged that the dislocation of 
the shoulder in 1954 could have caused a tear in the ten-
dons of the plaintiff's shoulder; that it may not have 
healed; that it could have caused a weakness to exist in 
the shoulder which would cause it to ugive away easily" 
upon a subsequent occasion (R. 75) . The doctor said it 
would be impossible for him to date the tear which he 
observed some time after the January 4, 1957 accident and 
would not be able to say with certainty whether or not 
the tear, or part of it, had existed prior to the January 4 
accident, but that in any event a previous tear would have 
made the area of the shoulder involved more prone to 
injury (R. 77) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING 
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN ALLOTING 
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THE NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT AS IT DID. 
POINT III 




THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING 
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE TO THE JURY. 
The plaintiff bases his argument that the court erred 
in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the 
jury on two points: 
( 1) That defendant relied on the principle of assump-
tion of risk rather than contributory negligence; and 
(2) That the only contributory negligence claimed by 
the defendant is that plaintiff elected to board the car in a 
dangerous place when he could have boarded in a safe place. 
With regard to plaintiff's first point defendant denies 
that its case is in any way founded or dependent upon 
the doctrine of assumption of risk. Defendant agrees with 
plaintiff that uEvery vestige of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk was obliterated from the law by the 1939 amend-
ment" to the Federal Employers Liability Act, (Tiller vs. 
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 318 U.S. 54, 87 
Lawyers Ed. 610). As admitted by plaintiff in his brief 
(P. 23) the court ((Instructed the jury that assumption of 
'· 
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risk was not a defense and that the burden of proving con-
tributory negligence was on the defendant." 
Consequently, defendant submits that none of plain-
tiff's cases with regard to assumption of risk are in point. 
Defendant relies, as will be demonstrated hereafter, on 
specific acts of negligence on the part of plaintiff to sus-
tain its position that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent and that the court was bound to submit the issue of 
contributory negligence to the jury. 
With regard to plaintiff's second claim, the defendant 
does not rely alone on plaintiff's selection of a place to 
board the car as his only act of contributory negligence. 
That was only one of several acts on his part which could 
be construed by reasonable men acting on a jury as con-
stituting negligence. Following are the acts appearing in 
the record which reasonable jurors could conclude to be 
negligent: 
1. Jurors might reasonably have believed that the 
plaintiff could and in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have selected a s:;tfer place to board the car because: 
(a) Plaintiff knew there were gouge marks left by 
the clam shell which could constitute a hazard unless he 
watched his footing carefully; 
(b) There is evidence there was only a ulight skiff of 
snow" on the ground (R. 31) ; 
(c) Plaintiff claimed the gouge mark involved was 
eight to twelve inches deep (R. 43); 
(d) The gouge marks were three to five feet apart 
(R. 23). 
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Members of the jury could reasonably have concluded 
that a hole eight to twelve inches deep could and should 
have been seen by the plaintiff if there was only a light 
skiff of snow on it; indeed, they could ask, how did the 
plaintiff know it was eight to twelve inches deep if it was 
not ·Capable of being observed; and inasmuch as there were 
areas three to five feet wide without holes or gouge marks, 
he had plenty of opportunity to stand in areas of safety to 
board the car and did not have to stand on the edge of a 
hole. 
2. The plaintiff admitted in his testimony that it was 
customary to take hold of a grab iron with both hands and 
distribute the task of pulling oneself up onto the car 
between both hands. On page 58 of the Record, plaintiff 
was asked by counsel uwhen you reached up, what was the 
usual way to do it, put the weight on one hand?" and the 
plaintiff answered nMost generally put the weight on 
both hands." Members of the jury may reasonably have 
concluded that the plaintiff was negligent in this instance 
in grabbing with one hand and imposing all of the initial 
strain on that one arm, his left, rather than using both 
arms, especially when the plaintiff was conscious of the 
fact that his left shoulder was weak from previous dis-
locations. 
3. The jury may have disbelieved the plaintiff when 
he stated that ttl stepped into a hole" because they may 
have realized the obvious fact that with one foot elevated 
in the stirrup of the car, it would be impossible for plain-
tiff to take a step with the other foot and therefore he 
must either have (a) missed his hand hold; or (b) slipped 
on the skiff of snow and fell because he negligently failed 
to acquire a firm grip on the grab iron-a grip sufficient 
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to stand the strain of pulling him up off the ground and 
onto the car. 
4. The members of the jury may reasonably have be-
lieved that the plaintiff carelessly got a foot in the stirrup 
before he took a firm grip-or any grip at all with his 
hand-and as a result lost his balance and slipped and fell. 
5. The jury may reasonably have concluded it was 
negligent for plaintiff to attempt to board the car from 
an area of rough footing when he could have walked along-
side the car and performed his duties. Mr. Sprunt claimed 
that he had to board the car so that he could give signals 
to the engineer. However, the jury may not have believed 
that in light of the fact that Mr. Patterson, the other 
switchman, testified that he, Patterson, was riding the head 
end car of the seven or eight car cut (R. 20), that is, the 
car farthest from the engine (the cars were being backed 
toward the hopper) and he, Patterson, gave the signal to 
the engineer to make the backward movement and to stop 
the movement when he saw the plaintiff lying on the 
ground. Therefore, according to Patterson's testimony he, 
Patterson, was where the engineer could see him and he 
being on the lead car would be the man to give the signal 
when to stop the cut in the vicinity of the hopper. In other 
words, in spite of the plaintiff's statement, it does not 
appear from the Record that the plaintiff would have been 
the man to give the signal, for he would have been riding 
on the east side of a car about halfway between the end 
of the cut and the engine. He would have been in no posi-
tion to know when the stop signal should be given to the 
engineer to stop the cut when the cars were properly lined 
up for the hopper (R. 20) . 
-. ·= ------ ·---
.. ,,.--~--------------
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6. The plaintiff states in-ane place in the record that 
he was standing still when he attempted to board the car. 
In another place he says he stepped in a hole. With this con-
flict in his account of the incident, members of the jury 
could reasonably have concluded that he was walking im-
mediately before he attempted to board or that at least he 
took one step before or as he. attempted to board and that 
he simply didn't observe with due care where he was 
stepping and that the careless step resulted in the slip and 
the fall. 
7. Members of the jury might have reasonably con-
cluded that the alleged hole had nothing to do with the 
fall; that the plaintiff didn't slip or step into a hole, be-
cause on page 59 of the record, plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
HQ. As you reached with your left hand, as you 
started to board, your foot went in a hole? 
HA. No, generally when you are boarding a car you 
swing yourself on, when I went to swing on I 
slipped." 
Earlier on page 43 of the record, the plaintiff said: 
H ••• it was done so quick I don't know how I fell." 
Consequently members of the jury could reasonably 
have concluded that the cause of this accident was that the 
plaintiff did not step with due care on the slippery snow 
on the ground and because of his lack of care simply 
slipped on the snow and the hole had nothing to do with it. 
The seven items above are all examples of conduct on 
the part of the plaintiff documented in the record which 
the Jury could reasonably consider negligence. None of 
them have anything to do with assumption of risk. None 
w:: 
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of them are dependent on or related to the assumption of 
risk doctrine. 
In light of the above decisions that might have been 
made by reasonable men acting on a jury, let us take a 
look at the law applicable. 
Defendant will borrow from one of the cases cited by 
the plaintiff in his brief to restate a well established prin-
ciple of law. The case is Anderson vs. Nixon, 139 P.2 216, 
a Utah case decided in 1943. 
((For the purpose of determining whether the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain plaintiff's con-
tentions, the jury having found in his favor, this 
court will consider as true where there is any con-
flict in the evidence that which is most favorable 
to plaintiff's position." 
What is good for the goose is good for the gander in 
determining whether or not an issue of negligence or con-
tributory negligence should be submitted to the jury. The 
above language from the Anderson case can be accurately 
paraphrased to apply in this case where the defendant is 
contending that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was properly submitted to the jury. 
((For the purpose of determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's con-
tention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, 
the jury having found in defendant's favor, this 
court should consider as true, where there is any 
conflict in the evidence, that which is most favor-
able to the defendant's position." 
In the case of Stickle vs. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany 251 P. 2 867 ( 1952 Utah), Justice Crockett sue-
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cinctly stated the position which the defendant takes in 
the case at bar. 
((It should be kept in mind that so far as the 
quantum of proof necessary to take the question of 
contributory negligence from the jury is concerned, 
the tests are the same as with respect to primary 
negligence." 
Later the court said: 
((In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; 
from its initiation and creation to its final applica-
tion and enforcement, the law is the expression of 
their will. The functioning of a cross-section of the 
citizenry as a jury is the method by which the 
people express this will in the application of law to 
controversies which arise under it. Both our con-
stitutional and statutory provisions assure trial by 
jury to citizens of this state. 
((Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate 
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by 
presuming to determine questions of fact which 
litigants have a right to have passed upon by juries. 
Part of the merit of the jury system is its safe-
guarding against such arbitrary power in the courts. 
To the great credit of the courts of this country, 
they have been extremely reluctant to infringe 
upon this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have 
kept the administration of justice close to the 
people." 
Justice Crockett went on later to say in the same 
optruon: 
HA very fine statement of the proper attitude 
toward this right was expressed for this court by 
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Short Line R. Co. where, in referring to the ques-
tion of submitting plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence to a jury, he made these statements: 
(The court can pass upon the question of 
negligence only in clear cases. 
t ••• unless the question of negligence is 
free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon 
it as a question of law; ... if ... the .court is 
in doubt whether reasonable men, . . . might 
arrive at different conclusions, then this very 
doubt determines the question to be one of 
fact for the jury and not one of law for the 
court.'" 
In the case of Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, 282 P. 2 304 (1955 Utah) which was a master and 
servant case, Justice McDonough speaking for the court 
said in the opinion: 
((It has been frequently announced by this 
court that contributory negligence is a question 
for the jury unless all reasonable men must draw 
the same conclusion from the facts as they are 
shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 
46, 234 P. 300, 3 8 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake 
City, 13 Utah 91,44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; 
Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679. 
As was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 
134, 58 P. 355, 358: 
(Where there is uncertainty as to the existence 
of either negligence or contributory negligence, the 
question is not one of law, but of fact, and to 
be settled by a jury; and this, whether the uncer-
tainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, or 
because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded 
men will honestly draw different conclusions from 
them.'" 
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In the case which plaintiff relies on most in his brief, 
that of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 
318 U.S. 54 (1943) the court clearly supports defendant's 
contention in this case 'that the issue of contributory negli-
gence should be submitted to the jury whenever there 
are any disputed questions of fact. Inasmuch as this is 
admittedly such an important case, a statement of the 
facts would not be inappropriate. In the court's words, 
the facts were as follows: 
(( ... Tiller (the plaintiff) was standing be-
tween two tracks in the respondent's switch yards, 
tracks which allowed him three feet, seven and 
one-half inches of standing space when trains were 
moving on both sides. The night was dark and the 
yard was unlighted. Tiller, using a flashlight for 
the purpose, was inspecting the seals of the train 
moving slowly on one track when suddenly he was 
hit and killed by the rear car of a train backing in 
the opposite direction on the other track. The rear 
of the train which killed Tiller was unlighted al-
though a brakeman with a lantern was riding the 
back step on the side away from Tiller. The bell 
was ringing on the engine but both trains were 
moving. The Circuit Court found that it was 
(probable that Tiller did not hear cars approaching' 
from behind him. No special signal of warning 
was given." 
After eloquently disposing of the defense of assump-
tion of risk, the court (Justice Black) said: 
uNo case is to be withheld from a jury on any 
theory of assumption of risk and questions of negli-
gence should under proper charge from the court 
be submitted to the jury for their determination. 
Many years ago this court said of the problems of 
., 
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negligence, (we see no reason, so long as the jury 
system is the law of the land, and the jury is made 
· the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact, 
why it shouldn't decide such questions as these as 
well as others.' Jones v. Tennessee, V & GR Com-
pany, 128 U.S. 443, 445, 32 Lawyers Edition 478, 
479. Or as we have put it on another occasion, 
(where the facts are in dispute, and the evidence in 
relation to them is that from which fair-minded 
men may draw different inferences,' the case should 
go to the jury. 
((We think that the question of negligence on 
the part of the railroad and on the part of the em-
ployee should have been submitted to the jury." 
In the Utah case of Cooper v. Evans, 262 P. 2d 278 
(Utah 1953), the principle of law is put in sharp focus 
by the fact that in that case the plaintiff claimed, as in 
this one, that she should have been determined by the 
court to be free of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. This case is particularly helpful because some of the 
facts of it are strikingly analagous to some of the facts 
involved in the case at bar. 
In the Cooper case the plaintiff received injuries in a 
fall over a portion of a merchandise platform owned by 
the defendants which jutted out into a walk-way in the 
defendants' store. The Trial court entered judgment for 
the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. In the trial 
court the judge had submitted an interrogatory for the 
jury to answer, asking whether plaintiff's failure to ob-
serve and see the platform amounted to contributory negli-
gence. The jury answered the question in the affirmative 
and based on the jury's finding of contributory negligence, 
the court entered judgment for the defendants. 
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The court, in the case at bar, might very well have 
submitted a similar interrogatory to the jury, asking 
whether or not they believed plaintiff's failure to observe 
a.nd see the hole in which he claimed he stepped, consti-
tuted contributory negligence. 
In the Cooper case, the court said: 
nit is to be noted that although the word cob-
serve' as used in the interrogatory could be given a 
meaning equivalent to (make observation for,' the 
more usual understanding is to regard the words 
(observe' and csee' as synonymous. Under such 
meaning, in telling the jury that Mrs. Cooper failed 
to (observe and see,' the court was only stating to 
them that uncontroverted fact, for Mrs. Cooper 
concedes that she did not see the obstruction. The 
court was aware that under the circumstances dis-
closed by the evidence, the conduct of Mrs. Cooper 
in failing to see the platform might, or might not, 
meet the standard of care required of her, and that 
the application of such standard is peculiarly within 
the province of the jury. 
((Plaintiff is in error in her contention that the 
question of the existence of contributory negli-
gence, under the situation which we here consider, 
is one of law. Contributory negligence would only 
be a question of law where the evidence showed, 
with such certainty that reasonable minds could 
not differ thereon, that the conduct in question 
either met or failed to meet the standard of due 
care. But where there is uncertainty as to whether 
such standard has been met so that reasonable minds 
could differ upon it, the question of whether such 
negligence exists is not a matter of law, but is one 
for the jury to determine." 
Baker v. Decker, 212 P. 2d 679, Utah 1949, another 
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case cited in the plaintiff's brief, is, we submit, excellent 
authority to support defendants' contentions. 
In that case plaintiff was walking along the second 
story hallway of the apartment house in which she re-
sided when she fell over equipment deposited in the hall-
way by the defendant, a house cleaning company. This 
is a case in which the plaintiff had an election of choosing, 
more or less safe places to walk. She could have taken a 
route which was not usually traveled by her but which 
would have been safer because it did not have equipment 
over which she would have to step. The court held that 
both the issues of the negligence and contributory negli-
gence should have been submitted to the jury. 
On page 682 the court said: 
((Under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, it was for the jury to determine whether or 
not plaintiff exercised due care and caution when 
she elected to continue down the hallway on the 
second floor rather than to proceed by a route not 
usually traveled by her." 
Later in the opinion, in stating that the question of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been sub-
mitted to the jury, the court said: 
((The last contention to be disposed of deals 
with the claim that plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence in stepping onto the canvas and 
catching her heel. We must keep in mind that 
the burden is upon the defendant to establish this 
claim and that unless all reasonable minds must 
conclude that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the 
manner in which she attempted to get over the 
canvas the question of her due care must be sub-
mitted to the jury for determination. We must 
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also keep in mind that this case falls within the 
category of cases dealing with pedestrians who. are 
subjected to unnecessary hazards by the thoughtless 
conduct of others. Ordinary reasonable persons 
will trip over objects, stumble over obstructions, 
slip on slick surfaces and fall into holes or excava-
tions. Even though they may see the object they 
sometimes fail to comprehend and anticipate the 
incident which precipitates the injury. Usually 
whether a reasonable person would have properly 
apprajsed the situatio-n and escaped injury is for 
a jury to determine." (Emphasis supplied) 
The case of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Com-
pany v. Morrill, 99 So. 297 (Alabama 1924) treats both 
problems so vital to plaintiff in his brief in the case at bar. 
That is, the assumption of risk and the election of a safe, 
as against a dangerous, method of doing something. The 
opinion could not be more in point because it specifically 
declares that when such an election problem is involved it 
is a matter of negligence and not a matter of assumption 
of risk. 
This case was brought under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act as that Act existed in 1924. Plaintiff's coun-
sel will initially contend that the case is not helpful because 
it was decided before the 19 3 9 amendment to the FELA. 
However, the facts and ruling will reveal that the decision 
of the court at that time is perfectly applicable to the case 
at bar. At that time assumption of risk could be a com-
plete defense for the railroad. But contributory negli-
gence was treated under the FELA in 1924 exactly as it is 
treated now. It was not a bar to recovery but only a 
source of diminution of damages. In the Louisville case, 
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an alternative, contributory negligence, hoping that the 
court would decide that plaintiff's conduct constituted 
assumption of risk. The court, however, decided that 
plaintiff's conduct did not constitute assumption of risk 
and might constitute contributory negligence, so the court 
submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. 
The court, therefore, had to distinguish between assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence in relation to 
plaintiff's conduct and decided that issue as the plaintiff 
wanted it decided. 
The facts were that the plaintiff alighted from a mov-
ing train, .collided with another railroad employee and was 
knocked under the train and in jured. 
The railroad contented that plaintiff's collision with 
another employee was a part of the risk of working for a 
railroad which he could anticipate and that he assumed 
that risk. The court didn't go along with that theory. 
The court recognized from the evidence that the plain-
tiff had the election of alighting from the train when he 
did or waiting until it stopped, as it would have done 
shortly. The court, on page 299, said: 
<<The chief contention of the appellant (de-
fendant railroad) is that the trial court confused 
contributory negligence with an assumption of risk 
and erroneously defined the conduct of the plaintiff, 
in the adoption of the more dangerous way to 
alight, as contributory negligence. We do not 
think that the trial court was in error in this re-
spect. If there are two ways in which an act can 
be done-one a safe way, the other a dangerous 
way-and the person who is doing the act chooses 
the dangerous way with knowledge of the danger, 
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he is guilty of contributory negligence, and not an 
assumption of risk." (Emphasis supplied) 
In the case at bar, the defendant's position is exactly 
what the court's position was in the Louisville railroad 
case. The defendant contends that there is evidence that 
plaintiff elected to do some things the dangerous way 
when he could have done them a safer way and the de-
fendant did not, and does not, contend that assumption of 
risk has anything to do with it, but that plaintiff's conduct 
constituted contributory negligence. As pointed out 
earlier in this brief, the jury had these facts to consider: 
the plaintiff could have elected to use two hands instead 
of one as he attempted to board the train; he chose to use 
one. The plaintiff could have selected a safer place to 
stand, that is, a place in one of those three to :five feet 
areas where there was no hole; instead of on the edge 
of a hole. The jury might also have concluded that the 
plaintiff could have elected to walk beside the train instead 
of boarding it when boarding it constituted some danger 
due to the uneven footing with which he was well ac-
quainted. Inasmuch as the jury could have decided that 
he was walking or at least taking a step or two immedi-
ately prior to his attempt to board, the jury would have 
been justified in concluding that he should have elected to 
stand still, on solid smooth footing before he made his at-
tempt to board. 
All of these elections available to the plaintiff and 
submitted to the minds of the jurors only substantiate de-
fendant's contention that the issue of plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence was properly submitted to the jury for 
determination. 
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In the case of Dickson v. Virginian Railway Com-
pany, 250 F. (2) 460 (4th Circuit, 1957), the court put 
the argument well in these words: 
(( ::- * * As this court recently said in Atlantic 
Coast Line Railroad Company v. Truett, 4th Cir-
cuit, 249 F. (2) 215, 217, (distilling the essential 
truth from a raw mixture of circumstances is the 
fact finder's function, and the jury is the instru-
ment our system provides for this purpose.' Courts 
are, and should be, astute not to substitute their 
judgment on issues of fact for that of juries when 
different inferences may be reasonably drawn from 
the evidence." 
In the FELA case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 
U. S. 53, a case arising out of Utah, Justice Douglas, re-
viewing all FELA cases decided by the court for the pre-
ceding ten years, said this: 
((The criterion governing the exercise of our 
discretion in granting or denying certiorari is not 
who loses below but whether the jury function in 
passing on disputed questions of fact and in draw-
ing inferences from proven facts has been re-
spected." 
POINT II 
THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN ALLOTTING 
THE NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT AS IT DID. 
There is in the record substantial evidence to justify 
the jury's determination that two-thirds of the fault in 
connection with this accident was attributable to the plain-
tiff's negligence. One view the jury may properly have 
taken was that there was very little negligence on the part 
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of the railroad. The jury may have reasonably concluded 
from the evidence there was little, if anything, the rail-
road could do about keeping the Vitro Chemical Company 
yard carpet smooth for its switchmen to walk on in light 
of the nature of the operation that was involved. This 
unloading of ore cars along the side of the track was a 
continuous and necessary operation. The work had to 
be done as long as Vitro continued to operate and the 
railroad continued to deliver ore. The ore had to be 
dumped, picked up with a clam shell bucket and stacked 
in piles. There is no evidence that there was any other or 
better way to do it. If the railroad had had time between 
loads and had devoted an ccarmy" of men to the job of 
cleaning up and grading and leveling and smoothing the 
area after each cut was unloaded, the area would have been 
cluttered and roughened again with each group of cars 
that were brought in. It was a work area. The men knew 
this. There was no_ way of avoiding it and still continu-
ing the operation. 
The plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Rask, under exami-
nation by plaintiff's own attorney clearly and honestly 
described the situation: 
uQ. It is necessary to keep it rough? 
uA. It is impossible to keep it otherwise with a con-
tinuous operation of those cars. 
uQ. You couldn't keep it up with a shovel as you do 
with men in your area? 
uA. If they had an army of men, but not for each 
continuous operation. 
uQ. What do you mean by continuous operation? 
uA. Dumping one car and another one on top, that 
is a continuous operation all day long." (R. 137). 
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Plaintiff's counsel was trying to get his witness to 
compare this work area in a private yard with non-work 
areas in railroad yards where the ground adjacent to the 
tracks was maintained in smooth condition with shovel 
and rakes. His witness was truthful and revealed the 
necessary difference that had to exist if the work was to 
be done. 
Perhaps defendant's counsel erred in not cross ap-
pealing and asking this court to reverse the lower court 
for not granting defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict, for it is still defendant's belief that there was no 
negligence on the part of the defendant railroad. How-
ever, believing that inasmuch as it has been so well and 
thoroughly established in FELA cases that weighing and 
evaluating the facts is the province of the jury, the de-
fendant considered it futile to cross appeal in spite of the 
lack of evidence of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. 
If members of the Jury considered the conduct of 
the railroad in the light of proper instructions as to negli-
gence given it by the court, then the jury was certainly 
justified in concluding the negligence of the railroad was 
minimal. 
Defendant's negligence is certainly doubtful under 
the language of Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opin-
ion in the plaintiff's favorite case, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Company, supra. Justice Frankfurter said: 
uBy specific provisions in the Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act, it has swept away 'assumption of 
risk' as a defense once negligence is established, but 
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it has left undisturbed the other meaning of (as-
sumption of risk,' namely, that an employee in-
jured as a consequence of being exposed to a risk 
which the employer in the exercise of due care 
could not avoid is not entitled to recover, since the 
employer was not negligent." (Emphasis supplied) 
Later in the opinion, Justice Frankfurter said: 
uThe basis of an action under the Act remains 
the carrier's negligence. The carrier is not to be 
relieved from the consequences of its negligence by 
any claim that the employee (assumed the risk' of 
its negligence. But neither is the carrier to be 
charged with those injuries which result from the 
rusual risks' incident to employment on railroads-
risks which cannot be eliminated through the car-
rier's exercise of reasonable care." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
Defendant submits that the rough condition of the 
Vitro Chemical yard was a condition which could not be 
eliminated through the carrier's exercise of reasonable 
care, and that therefore the defendant was not negligent 
at all. However, the matter was submitted to the jury, 
the jury decided there was some negligence on the part of 
the railroad, and we will abide by that decision. 
The writer has already described in the discussion of 
the previous point the negligence of the plaintiff, and 
comparing that with the negligence of the railroad, it cer-
tainly appears there is substantial evidence to justify the 
jury in apportioning the negligence as it did. 
In the case of Williams v. Ogden Union Railway f5 
Depot Company, 230 P. (2) 315, (Utah, 1951), an FELA 
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damages, the court made a statement which is equally ap-
plicable to the issue of inadequate damages: 
((The power to require remissions should not be 
used as a sword to require minor variations in the 
proportions of contributory negligence to negli-
gence ~ .. * * Jury verdicts need not be tailored to 
exact specifications." 
All of the cases cited under the discussion of Point I 
with regard to viewing the evidence in the light most fav-
orable to the defendant and with regard to honoring the 
right of the jury to weigh the evidence are also applicable 
in the discussion of Point II. 
POINT III 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS 
NOT INADEQUATE. 
Plaintiff contends that the verdict of $15,000.00 
awarded to the plaintiff before diminution for contribu-
tory negligence was inadequate. 
Plaintiff avoids facing squarely the statutory grounds 
upon which a demand for a new trial for inadequate 
damages is based, to-wit, Rule 59 (a) ( 5) , U tab Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows: 
((Excessive or inadequate damages appearing 
to have been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice." 
In other words, in the rule granting of a new trial for 
inadequate damages is tied to passion or prejudice. 
Plaintiff in his brief makes no contention that the 
jury entertained any passion or prejudice against the plain-
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tiff, and indeed there is no evidence whatsoever to in-
dicate that they felt anything but the normal sympathy 
toward an injured plaintiff. 
The jury was properly and adequately instructed on 
the subject of damages and plaintiff's counsel quite prop-
erly has and makes no complaint with regard to that. 
In Saltas v. A/fleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. (2) 178, a 
case involving the propriety of granting a new trial for 
inadequate damages, the court said: 
ult is seldom that the amount of the verdict, 
standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as to 
indicate passion or prejudice." (Citing Miller v. 
Southern Pacific Company, 82 Utah 46, 21 P. (2) 
865}. 
In Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, the 
court said: 
((As said by some courts, juries, in cases of tort, 
are more prone to over estimate than under esti-
mate damages, and for that reason trial courts have 
more often been justified in interfering with ver-
dicts on the grounds of excessive damages than on 
the grounds of inadequate damages." 
It should be recalled that plaintiff's counsel moved 
for a new trial on the same grounds as those set forth in 
his brief, including the issue of inadequate damages; that 
a hearing was held, the matter argued before the trial 
court, and the trial court, who had the opportunity of 
hearing the evidence and observing the witnesses and the 
jury, refused to grant a new trial. 
In Eleganti v. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 168 
P. 266, the court said: 
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((The mere fact that the verdict of a jury may 
be excessive is not alone sufficient to show that it 
is the result of passion or prejudice. 
rry he criteria is the same for inadequate dam-
ages as for excessive dam,ages. (Emphasis supplied) 
No distinction is made between the granting of a 
new trial because of excessive damages and the 
order of a new trial by reason of the fact that the 
damages awarded by the verdict are inadequate. 39 
Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 145, p. 151." 
In Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 TJtah 82, 218 P. 
(2) 1080, (1950) the court said: 
((Previously decided cases are of little value in 
fixing present day standards or in assisting courts 
in determining excessive awards. Both the court 
and jury are required to deal with many unknown 
factors and a good guess is about the best that 
can be hoped for. The permissible minimum and 
maximum limits within which a jury may operate 
for a given injury are presently far apart and must 
continue to be widespread so long as pain and suf-
fering must be measured by money standards. If 
the jurors award damages which all reasonable per-
sons would conclude were not outside permissible 
limits, we cannot invade their province by substi-
tuting our judgment for theirs, but when we 
believe that all reasonable minds would conclude 
the limits have been exceeded we are permitted to 
correct the error." (Emphasis added.) 
There is also another factor which the jury and this 
court may properly take into consideration in determin-
ing whether or not damages are adequate. In cases of 
doubtful liability, a court should not upset a verdict on 
the grounds of inadequate damages. 
-- -------,-___,.,...,,~---------------
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This is not a new or novel principle. It has been 
recognized in many cases. In McDowell v. City of Ports-
mouth, 3 5 S. E. 821 (Va.), it was held that if the evidence 
preponderates in the defendant's favor on the question of 
liability a new trial is not to be granted for inadequate 
damages, even though it is sufficient to support a verdict 
that defendant is liable. The court quoted with approval 
the language used in Rawle v. Mclllhenny, 177 S. E. 214, 
98 A.L.R. 930, where it was said: 
uThe right of a plaintiff to have a verdict in 
his favor set aside, over the objection of the de-
fendant, on the ground of inadequacy, does not 
depend solely upon the evidence bearing upon the 
damage he has suffered. Both the apparent cause 
for the return of an inadequate verdict and the 
state of the evidence relative to the liability of the 
defendant have an important, and to a considerable 
extent interacting bearing upon the plaintiff's right 
to have the verdict set aside." 
In Olek v. Fern Rock Woolen Mills, 180 F. 117, an 
employee brought suit against his employer on the grounds 
that the defendant had negligently furnished the plaintiff 
an unsafe place to work. The plaintiff recovered a verdict 
for $250.00. Motion for a new trial on the grounds of 
inadequate damages was denied. The court said: 
((There was sufficient evidence of defendant's 
negligence to carry the case to the jury, but in the 
judgment of the court the great weight of the evi-
dence was against the plaintiff's right to recover 
anything." 
In Burkitt v. Vail, 215 P. 887 (Ore.), plaintiff re-
covered damages of $1.00 on account of negligent damage 
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to a truck. A motion for a new trial on grounds of inade-
quate damages was denied. On appeal the supreme court 
held that a new trial was properly denied and said: 
ccThe evidence in the instant case was such 
that the jury could reasonably and properly have 
returned a verdict for the defendant." 
In Cochran v. Wilson, 229 S. W. 1050 (Mo.), the 
plaintiff sought a new trial on the grounds that the dam-
ages awarded her were inadequate. It was a suit for per-
sonal injuries in which she had recovered a verdict in the 
sum of $250.00. In affirming the lower court, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri recognized appellant's right to 
have a verdict set aside for either an excessively large or 
ridiculously small amount where the result indicated pas-
sion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The court 
said that in passing upon such questions the presumption 
is in favor of the good conduct of the jury and ccif upon 
the whole record the case preponderates in favor of the 
defendant, or the testimony is evenly balanced, the courts 
will refuse to interfere with nominal verdicts, although 
at first view they may appear illogical." The court ap-
proved the idea, that the reason for holding tenaciously to 
damages found by a jury in personal injury cases is that in 
this class of cases there is no scale by which the damages 
may be graduated with certainty. ccThe damages admit of 
no other test than intelligence of the jury, governed by a 
sense of justice." 
A review of our discussion under Point II may indi-
cate to the court that the members of the jury might prop-
erly have been influenced to some extent in their award of 
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damages on the realization that there was little, if any, 
negligence on the part of the railroad. 
However, whether that was in their minds or not, 
defendant, submits that the $15,000.00 verdict was sub-
stantial and thoroughly adequate in light of the fact that 
plaintiff is in good health other than the trouble he is hav-
ing with his shoulder, and that it was obvious to the jury 
that there are many types of work that he could do, and 
that he would not be confined to the job of driving a cab 
or limited to an income of $90'.00 a month. 
CONCLUSION 
Bearing on all three points discussed in this brief, 
are a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court and a 
much quoted decision of the United States Supreme Court. 
In Horsley v. Robinson, 186 P. (2) 592 {Utah 1947), 
Justice Wade's language, we submit, wraps up the argu-
ment covering all issues raised in the plaintiff's brief: 
uSince the trial court is not required to submit 
special interrogatories and therefore we do not 
know how the jury in fact did determine the con-
trolling issues we must presume that they found the 
facts necessary to support their verdict if the evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain such a finding. Thus 
we must view the evidence in its most favorable 
aspect to suppot:_t the verdict which the jury has 
rendered and if from the evidence the jury could 
reasonably find facts necessary to sustain their ver-
dict it must be sustained. This is true, even though 
had we been the triers of the facts we would have 
found them differently, or even though we may 
not believe that the jury did in fact so find or, 
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even though we.believe that such a finding would be 
against the great preponderance of the evidence. 
u ( 1 ) Under a general verdict we cannot be 
assured what facts the jury found or that they 
found the facts necessary to sustain their verdict. 
So it is universally held under the common law 
system, as it must be in order to give stability to 
jury verdicts, that the appellate court must sus-
tain the verdict where the evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding of the necessary facts to do so. 
Otherwise, the appellate court would be required 
to reverse every verdict where in its opinion the 
great preponderance of the evidence is against a 
finding of the necessary facts to support it, even 
though the evidence is such that reasonable minds 
might conclude from the evidence that such neces-
sary facts happened. To do so would be to review 
the evidence no matter what we call it. The ques-
tion of what were the facts and where is the pre-
ponderance of the evidence is for the jury and not 
for the court to determine. Our problem is only to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the verdict. In doing so our standard is: 
Could a reasonable. mind be convinced by the evi-
dence of the necessary facts to support the verdict? 
If so, it must be sustained. 
((That this court is not authorized to review 
the facts found by the jury is expressly provided 
by our Constitution, Article 8, Section 9, where it 
is provided (In cases at law the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone.' Since we cannot review 
thefacts, whatever we think of where the prepon-
derance of the evidence is, is immaterial. If we 
were to review the evidence and reverse this case 
because we think the preponderance of the evi-
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dence on a material issue is against the plaintiff, we 
do so in violation of that constitutional provision." 
In the FELA case of Tennant v. Peoria f5 P. U. Ry. 
Co., 321 U. S. 29, one of the leading and frequently cited 
cases on this question, wherein the lower court had set 
aside a jury verdict, the Supreme ~court of the United 
States said: 
uNo court is then justified in substituting its 
conclusions for those of the twelve jurors. 
* * * 
uit is not the function of a court to search the 
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence nor 
to take the case away from the jury on the theory 
that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent 
and uncertain inferences. 
* * * 
uCourts are not free to re-weigh the evidence 
and set aside the jury verdict merely because the 
jury could have drawn different inferences or con-
clusions or because judges feel that other results are 
more reasonable." (Emphasis supplied) 
Defendant submits that the jury's verdict in the case 
at bar should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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